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I.

OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS;
PLAINTIFF OMITTED FACTS WHICH SHOW THAT THE CITY DID NOT
PERFORM BUT BREACHED THE CONTRACT AND ACTED IN BAD FAITH.
A.

The City Issued Licenses by its Mayor, the Next Mayor Filed Suit Claiming
That the Licenses Did Not Conform to the Then Existing Ordinances.

In 1979 Plaintiff, through its mayor Alton Ball, issued "licenses" to the Defendant
granting him the right to erect and maintain billboard signs along 1-80 in the City limits. (R 37)
In 1982 a new mayor, Merlin Johnson, (who is also the current mayor) caused the City to file a
lawsuit alleging that the licenses issued by Mayor Ball did not meet the requirements of the then
current zoning ordinance. That ordinance required that "permits" be issued through the City's
designated representative or the City council. (Trial Exhibit 30, Appellant's Addendum) Since
Mayor Ball issued "licenses" instead of permits; and since the City Council did not pass on the
"licenses," Mayor Johnson felt that the "licenses" did not properly comply with the City
ordinances, and filed suit. In 1983 the "Stipulation" was entered into by the parties. (Appellant's
Addendum)
This background is important since the Defendant maintains that the City has acted in bad
faith from the beginning and up to this appeal. The basis of alleging of bad faith is that the City
knew that the original licenses were issued in good faith by the City in 1979; they were issued by
the City's designated representative (Mayor Ball); they substantially complied with the
ordinance; and that the Defendant's reliance on the actions of the City was reasonable. On
March 24, 1983 the City Council Minutes reflect the following:

1

Mayor Merlyn Johnson mentioned the bill boards with All Associates. He
mentioned the present schedule of the present bill boards. The Mayor said that
the place where Billy's used to be is now open. It could be used as a "Welcome to
Coalville" sign. Al Lundgren said his cost would not be more than $5,200.00.l If
Coalville bought the sign, they would take over the lease on the land until it runs
out with C.B. Copely. Terry Christiansen said the bill should be itemized. He
suggested that we make a decision now so this can be settled. He suggested
buying the sign so that we have a chance of getting the rest of the signs down in
the future. If we don't buy the sign, we will be back in litigation and with our
present zoning ordinances, we would probably loose. (Sic) If the City buys the
sign, they will have to maintain it. As long as the contract is in force, we would
hawe to pay the $200.00 a year and lease the property. Terry Christiansen said
we have four choices: 1. Sign the agreement and buy the sign so that all the signs
wiill be down in 20 years, 2. Go with the law suit that we will probably loose,
(sic) leaving the signs up indefinitely, 3. Drop the law suit and the signs will be up
as long as he wants them, or 4. Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made a motion
that we purchase the sign in order to close the litigation. Colleen R. Sargent
seconded the motion. All ayes, but Grant Geary who opposed. The Mayor and
Attorney signed the Order of Dismissal.2 (Addendum Trial Exhibit 26.)
City Attorney Christiansen knew their suit was not in good faith. He also knew that the
City had to sign the Stipulation and buy a sign in order to eventually get the signs out. He
explained that to the City Council. The City Council agreed and voted to buy the sign. (R. 217219.) But the City never made the purchase - they did not even tell the Defendant that they had
made the decision to purchase. The bad faith arises from the fact that the Plaintiff has known
since 1983 that (1) it did not file a lawsuit with merit and (2) that in order to make the Stipulation
binding it had to purchase a sign. They were willing to do or say anything to avoid going to
court and still be able to remove signs.

1

Lundgren was not present at this meeting, this is a fact reported to the City
Council by the City Attorney or the Mayor.
2

This is the entire text of the minutes from March 24, 1983 regarding the signs.
2

B.

The Sole Issue on Appeal in 1987 Was Whether the Stipulation Was
Enforceable Because the Defendant Believed He Withdrew His Signature.

Another omitted significant fact is that the Defendant believed that he withdrew his
signature from the Stipulation. (R 120) Although the City ratified the Stipulation, no notice of
ratification was provided to the Defendant, neither did the City act on any of its responsibilities.
This failure to act enforced the Defendant's good faith belief that neither he nor the City
considered the Stipulation binding for a period of almost three years. (R 119) Then in 1986 the
City moved for an order to have a sign removed. The Defendant resisted claiming that the
Stipulation was not enforceable because he had withdrawn. This was the sole issue, which was
heard on a motion (i.e., no testimony, nor evidence) before Judge Daniels in 1986, and on which
he ruled. This is the only issue submitted to the Supreme Court. It refused to consider the
matter. (Plaintiffs fact #19. Pg 8, states that the appeal was based on the lack of compliance by
the City of the Stipulation, the correct fact should read that the appeal was based on defendant's
contention that the Stipulation was invalid because defendant withdrew his signature.)
C.

The Plaintiff Took No Action to Show its Intent to Honor the Stipulation
until 1987, and Then it Was Only to Demand Performance of the Defendant,
Not to Tender its Own Performance.

From 1983 through 1987 the Defendant acted and believed that the Stipulation was not
enforceable. Ironically, the City also treated the Stipulation with contempt for the same period of
time because (a) it did not issue permits until 1986 (R 182), and those were invalid; (b) it did not
take any action to purchase or lease a sign (other than to approve a purchase in a City Council
meeting - which decision was never communicated to the Defendant) and (c) it did not make any

3

effort to publish the preference for the Defendant - all of which were required by the Stipulation.
Other facts absent or otherwise erroneous from Plaintiffs "statement of facts" include:
1) The City Council voted to purchase a sign from Defendant on the date it ratified the
Stipulation. Appellant's Addendum, Exhibit 26. This was a duty imposed by the Stipulation,
paragraph 1. The City never followed through on the purchase, neither did it ever notify the
Defendant of its decision. (R. 993; Plaintiffs Statement of Facts #14; Plaintiffs Brief p. 8.)
2) Although the City Council approved the Stipulation, there is no record in the minutes
that the City ever approved issuance of permits to the Defendant, nor any direction to the Mayor
or any other city representative to issue the permits. There is a record of another City employee
issuing permits after the 'new' 1983 ordinance was passed . (R 259) Terry Christiansen, City
attorney during the negotiations and to 1988 (R. 75) could not recall whether the council passed
on the permits (R. 78, 87) although he did recall that the City elected to buy a sign. (R. 85) He
further stated that the City wanted to wait to issue the permits until the new ordinance went into
effect. (R 87) This, of course, would require that the permits would conform to the new
ordinance. Mayor Johnson stated that he signed the permits sometime in 1985, but did not know
whether the permits were ever delivered to the Defendant. (R 220, 253). Mayor Johnson could
not find evidence of authorization in the City Council minutes, (R 221 - 222) and further
admitted that he did not know whether as mayor he could sign the permits, but that he did so in
ignorance of the law and claimed he did so on advice of the City Council and attorney. (R 239)
3) The invalid sign permits were issued by the Mayor, immediately prior to the removal
date of the first sign, some three years after the signing of the Stipulation. (Exhibit 25; R. 182)

4

4) The City amended its sign ordinance about a year after approving the Stipulation. It
took no action prior to that date, nor in the amended ordinance, to publish the preference required
under the Stipulation. (Plaintiffs Brief, Statement of Facts #s 10, 11, p. 7.)
D.

The Plaintiffs Recital of Facts from the Trial Is Incorrect; the Defendant
Proved He Suffered Damages; the City Made Its Decision to Purchase
Absolving the Defendant of Any Duty to Supply Additional Cost
Information; and the City Neglected to Admit That the It Misrepresented to
the District Court That the City Had an Interest in a Certain Sign When in
Fact It Knew That It Had No Such Interest.

1) The City claims that the Defendant did not prove any damages arising from the invalid
'new' permits. However, testimony was given at trial by both the Defendant and an expert
witness about the loss of value directly relating to the invalid permits. (Defendant's Exhibit 36;
R. 320, 339, 342; 433; 372; 390; 401.)
2) The City claims that no sign lease or cost information was provided after the signing of
the Stipulation. (Appellee's Fact 13. Page 7-8) However, the City already had made its choice
to purchase a sign based on previously submitted information on the date it decided to ratify the
Stipulation. There was no reason to provide information to assist the City in its choice to lease or
purchase a sign, since it had already made that decision! Moreover, the City never requested any
additional information.
3) Plaintiff raises in its fact number 24, p 9-10 that the Defendant was cited for contempt
for removing a "certain" sign. The background facts show that the Defendant contracted with the
Coalville Chamber of Commerce, which was not associated with the City in any manner; for a
sign to promote Coalville businesses. The Plaintiff omits to state that it knowingly and
intentionally misrepresented to the district court that the Plaintiff had an interest in that sign and
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that the sign was part of a fulfillment of the Stipulation to benefit the City. The order arising
from the hearing required the Defendant to keep that sign in place for the benefit of the City.
The Defendant later removed the sign. (R 138-152) The court did not sanction the City for its
misrepresentation, although it certainly had sufficient grounds to do so. It is important to note
that the Defendant took down the Chamber sign under the terms of the agreement with the
Chamber (the sign was a public service sign for the Chamber, it paid $600 for part of the cost of
painting, nothing for the monthly rental); that the removal followed the misrepresentation by the
City to the court, and followed several years where the City refused to obey any of its obligations
under the Stipulation, yet continued to demand strict adherence by the Defendant. The removal
of the sign was in accord with the Defendant's agreement of the Chamber.
The City's complaint for contempt did not relate to any harm to the City. Indeed it is
dubious that the City had the standing to raise the issue of contempt since it did not have any
interest in the Chamber sign in the first place. If there is a issue over the removal of the sign it
should be with the Chamber - who never objected to the removal of the sign - not with the City.
II.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RECISSION.
Plaintiff states that the "Defendant has been granted permits allowing him to maintain his

signs along Interstate 80 for the past 13 years. (Plaintiffs Brief, p. 12) The foundational fact
statement for Plaintiffs argument does not disclose that the "permits" issued to the Defendant
were invalid. These permits were not issued until 1986, almost three years after the Stipulation
was signed. Furthermore, these "permits" were not issued in conformance with the sign
ordinance which was in force at the time the permits were issued, which required the zoning
administrator to approve and issue the permits. In late 1985 Mayor Johnson claims that he issued
6

the permits - in ignorance of the requirements of the ordinance which was passed in 1983 - on
advice of the City Council and the attorney, but he could not find any reference in any City
Council meeting for that approval. These permits were no better than the original "licenses"
which the City claims were invalid when it filed the lawsuit in 1982. It is ironic that Mayor
Johnson instituted suit against the Defendant claiming he did not have the proper permits
according to the City ordinances;3 then he turned around and ignored the City ordinances to issue
invalid permits. That is quintessential bad faith.
Furthermore, the Defendant was entitled to retain his signs over the period of years, both
by the terms of the Stipulation and by provision of law which does not require the Defendant to
perform when the Plaintiff is in breach. Plaintiffs inference that Defendant suffers no damages
because he retained some signs ignores the damages from the wrongfully removed signs and
damages from the other breaches of the City.
Plaintiff does not cite any reference for its claim that the Defendant must satisfy three
factors to be entitled to rescission. However, Defendant satisfies these factors: (1) the City did
materially breach its obligations, (2) notice of rescission was raised in 1985; and (3) the
Defendant is before this court with clean.
Furthermore, Plaintiff raised the issue of notice for the first time on appeal, and this court
should not consider it. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).

3

The original ordinance required an applicant to obtain permits from the City
Council or designated representative. The Defendant obtained licenses from the Mayor. He
relied on the instructions and guidance of the mayor. Trial Exhibit 30.
7

A.

Coalville City Is in Material Breach of the Stipulation; the Stipulation Fails
for Lack of Consideration; the Plaintiff Was Never Found in Substantial
Compliance of the Stipulation; the Defendant Suffered Actual Damages.
1.

Defendant Finds No Order Stating the City Is in Substantial
Compliance of the Stipulation.

Plaintiff commences its defense that the City is not in material breach by asserting that
the City has substantially complied with the terms of the Stipulation according to certain court
orders. (Plaintiffs Brief p. 13) But this statement is not supported by the court orders. Judge
Daniels issued an order dated June 23, 1986; it did not state that the City substantially complied.
Judge Daniels issued another order dated September 22, 1986 denying Defendant's Motion to
Alter or Amend the June 23, 1986 order; it did not state that the City substantially complied.
Judge Hansen issued an order dated September 6, 1989; it did not state that the City substantially
complied. Judge Noel, in 1995, did not find that the City substantially complied, in fact found
that the City was liable for judgment for its breach. Defendant is not aware of any other orders.4
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the appeal in 1986 was based on a "substantial
compliance order" by the district court in 1986. That order does not make a finding of
substantial compliance. That order, later appealed, was issued arising from the a hearing from an
Order to Show Cause why a sign should not be removed according to the terms of the
Stipulation. Defendant opposed arguing only that they had withdrawn their signatures before the
City accepted and signed the Stipulation. (R. 120) The lower court only held that the Stipulation

4

Defendant searched all of the orders and did not locate any record of where any
court entered an order or made a finding that the Plaintiff substantially complied. Even if such
an order exists, it would not be based on a complete hearing of the facts, since only one trial was
held, all other orders resulted from law and motion hearings without testimony.
8

was enforceable. (Order dated June 23, 1986.) The Supreme Court refused to consider the
appeal. There was no trial nor evidence on the issues, only a hearing before the court on the
City's Motion.5
2.

The Stipulation Fails under Contract Principles and Should Not Be
Enforced.

The Stipulation fails for lack of consideration. A stipulation is an agreement of
compromise and settlement and constitutes an executory accord.6 Since an executory accord
"constitutes a valid enforceable contract,"7 basic contract principles affect the determination of
when a settlement agreement should be so enforced. Mascaro v.Davis. 741 P.2D 938, 942, 943
(1987). A contract fails for lack of consideration (or mutuallity, supra.) The Defendant did not
obtain any consideration from the City arising from the Stipulation.8
One of the cornerstone rules of contract law is that an agreement must be supported by
adequate consideration. Resource Mgt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
1036 (Utah 1985). Consideration is an act or promise bargained for and given in exchange for a
5

When motions by the Plaintiff and Defendant were reviewed at a pre-trial
conference held by Judge Brian in 1995, the court reviewed the file and acknowledged that there
had never been a full and complete consideration of all of the issues, only piecemeal
consideration of fragmented issues. Judge Brian ordered that a trial on all issues be held. The
trial court was the only court to consider all of the issues.
6

L & A DrywalL Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980)
(citing Cox Constr. Co. v. State Road Comm'n. 583 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1978)).
7

Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982); see
Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 699 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Utah 1985).
8

The City stated in trial that it had not sustained damages and only sought its
attorney fees. It did not tender any consideration, nor did it sustain damages. The Stipulation
was a windfall for the City, since it knew it would lose the lawsuit if tried. (Addendum, March
24, 1983 minutes.)
9

promise. Id. Consideration may be found "whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where [a]
promisee suffers a detriment." Gasser v. Home. 557 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976); Sugarhouse
Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d
628, 632 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Whether a particular benefit or detriment may serve as
consideration to support a contract is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson. 120 Wash.2d 178, 840 P.2d 851, 860 (1992).
Judge Noel found that the City had breached because it did not purchase or lease a sign as
required by paragraph 1. However, the Plaintiff expands the language and meaning of Judge
Noel's determination when it implies he found: "the City's failure to purchase or lease a sign did
not go to the consideration of the Stipulation." (Plaintiffs Brief p 15.) The court's findings and
order do not make any such ruling. (Plaintiffs Addendum, Exhibit 1.)
When these rules are applied to the facts it is clear the Defendant never got any
consideration, but suffered a great harm. Defendant agreed to remove nine signs which have an
undisputed value of $48,000 each, plus a loss of cash flow. (R 436-437.) In exchange the
Plaintiff agreed to dismiss its lawsuit, which they acknowledged had no chance of success;9
purchase or lease a sign; issue valid permits and publish the preference. The lawsuit was never
dismissed, it is the same suit which is before this court; Plaintiff never made the purchase; the
permits which were issued were invalid; and Plaintiff never published the preference. The
Defendant did not get any consideration.

9

On March 24, 1983 the Stipulation was presented to the City Council for
approval, the City Attorney advised the Council to approve the Stipulation because the City
would probably lose the lawsuit. (Appellant's Addendum, Trial Exhibit 26.)
10

An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer,
including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer. Williams v. Espey.
11 Utah 2d 317, 322, 358 P.2d 903, 906 (1961); see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 43 (1963) (price and
method of performance are two material terms of an offer). The burden of proof for showing the
parties' mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is on the party claiming that there is
a contract. B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst. 28 Utah 2d 442, 444, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972).
Here the parties both treated the Stipulation as though it did not exist. The Plaintiff did not
deliver permits for three years, and then they were invalid; although the Plaintiff voted to accept
the Stipulation and purchase a sign, it never notified the Defendant; the Stipulation required the
Plaintiff to publish a preference, but the Plaintiff failed to publish and instead approved two
separate sign ordinances which banned off-premises signs. Not only did the Plaintiff not assent
to the terms of the Stipulation, it took steps which diametrically opposed the intent of the
Stipulation. Plaintiff fails to show it accepted the Stipulation in any way by its conduct.
The contractual defense of impossibility is designed to relieve a party of its obligation
under a contract where its performance has been rendered legally impossible. The defense has
been defined as follows:
Under the contractual defense of impossibility, an obligation is deemed
discharged if an unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and
without fault of the obligated party, which events makes performance of the
obligation impossible or highly impracticable. Western Properties v. Southern
Utah Aviation. 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App.1989) (footnotes omitted.)
See also Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.. 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("a party
may be relieved of performing an obligation under a contract where supervening events,
unforeseeable at the time the contract is made, render performance of the contract impossible").
11

The test for impossibility is not hard and fast, but must take into consideration at what point
performance under the contract can no longer be reasonably required: "It is now recognized that
'[a] thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.'" Transatlantic
Fin. Corp. v. United States. 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C.Cir.1966). When the City passed its 1983
ordinance it became impossible for the Defendant to realize the consideration for which he
bargained. The City made off-premises signs illegal; using the City's interpretation of paragraph
13 of the Stipulation, even if the City published the preference, the Defendant could never build
an off-premise sign. Likewise, the City could not issue permits for off-premise signs because
they were now illegal. The City's actions made the fulfillment of the Stipulation impossible, and
the Defendant should be excused from performance from that date, late 1983.
3.

The Plaintiff Cannot Violate its Own Ordinances as an Excuse for
Performance.

The Plaintiff asserts that the permits were never challenged by the City. (Plaintiffs Brief
p 15) This argument is self serving and hypocritical. The City filed suit when Mayor Ball
issued "licenses" and a Mayor Johnson objected. There is nothing to stop the next mayor from
asserting that Mayor Johnson's permits were not validly issued and demanding removal of the
remaining 'permitted' signs. The City does not disagree that the permits are invalid, they just
excuse their behavior by stating that they do not object to the permits.
Sandy v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992) states that a City cannot ignore its
own ordinances. "Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a statute and issues
a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of administrative authority granted."
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Travelers Indem. Co. v. Barnes. 191 Colo. 278, 552 P.2d 300, 303 (1976). Yet the City claims
that it impliedly authorized issuance of permits in 1983 when it approved the Stipulation, and
that the authorization was valid when the Mayor issued the permits in 1985-86. (Plaintiffs Brief
pi 6) The authorization, if it exists at all, cannot last for three years. First there is no record that
the City Council ever actually approved the sign permits in 1983 or any other time thereafter.
Second, the new ordinance was an intervening event which requires that permits after enactment
would have to comply with the new ordinance. Third, there are new City Council members
sitting who may not have knowledge of any former implied agreements. The City gives no
excuse for its three year delay to issue the permits. Just like it gives no excuse for its failure to
purchase the sign, or its failure to publish the preference. The City cannot violate its own
ordinances, nor pick and choose between the version of its ordinances. The City would certainly
not tolerate an applicant to attempt to pick and choose between the ordinances it wants to abide.
The City does not - and cannot - cite any case which supports its proposition.10 When the
Coalville City Council changed its sign ordinance one must suppose that the change was for a
purpose. Cf., Thompson v. Department of the Treasury. 557 F.Supp. at 167.
In State v. Zeimer. 10 Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111,1113 (1960), the word "shall" was
defined: "The word 'shall' is usually presumed to be mandatory. Other uses of the word 'shall' in
the same provision are clearly mandatory. Therefore, the word should be so interpreted here."
The language of the 1983 Coalville ordinance is likewise imperative and mandatory, and does

10

Cf., Wadsworth v. Santaquin Citv. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1938)
(change in city charter supercedes previous form of government.)
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not allow some other interpretation. The 'new' 1983 Development Ordinance § 8.4 reads:
"Unless otherwise provided herein, no sign shall be erected, relocated or enlarged until the sign
has been approved and a permit issued by the Zoning Administrator." It was under this
ordinance that the permits for the signs should have been issued. It was also illegal under this
ordinance to permit off-premise signs, so the permits were void, ab initio.
It cannot be stressed enough that the defective permits issued by the City are clouded.
Whether or not the City ever objects to the permits does not remove the cloud on the veracity of
the permits. A third party buyer of Defendant's signs cannot rely on the assertions of Mayor
Johnson that some future administrator may not object to the permits. The defective permits are
no different than a cloud on a title of real property. Regardless of whether a party has objected
does not remove the potential problem. The damage is not one which can be resolved by a
statement from the City, it is one which can only be resolved by the issuance of valid permits.
4.

Defendant Suffered Damages and Is Entitled to an Award to
Compensate Him.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant reaped benefits by virtue of the signs, and did not
suffer any damages. (Plaintiffs Brief pp 15 & 18) He was entitled to any benefits he received
from his signs under the Stipulation. Furthermore, the Defendant and Defendant's expert
witness testified at trial that the Defendant sustained damages as a result of the defective permits.
The Defendant sustained $579,316 in deimages from the loss from signs removed and an
additional $143,728 from lost profits from signs permits and construction which should have
been given to Defendant under paragraph 13. (R. 339, 342, et seq.; 433 et seq.; Plaintiffs
Addendum. Exhibit 36.) In addition, Mr. Card testified that the permits were valued at $40,000
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each (R. 438) and that the signs were valued at about $48,000 each. (R. 437). The Defendant
also lost the value of good will and prestige which would follow a preference published in an
official City sign policy.
The Defendant also sought its costs and attorney fees in the action. (R. 377, 442).
Plaintiff does not mention that the trial was a result of various complaints, motions and
orders to show cause filed by both parties. (Plaintiffs Brief p 18) These were to be considered
at trial. Defendant incurred substantial legal expenses for defending the City's frivolous and
unjustified persistence to have the signs remove, all the while refusing to perform.
5.

The Stipulation Is Drafted in Plain Language and Should Be
Interpreted Accordingly.

Plaintiff argues that paragraph 13, the preference to be published, only refers to "offpremises" signs. The sign ordinance in effect at the time the Stipulation was drafted and signed
provided for numerous different kinds of signs, i.e.: identification, bulletin board, overhanging,
etc. (Defendant's Addendum, Exhibit 30, (§ 60.4.1(h)). If the City wanted to limit the type of
signs for which it wanted to grant the preference it could have - and should have. The City was a
substantial if not the primary drafter of the document. (R. 408; 424.) The language of
paragraph 13 is not ambiguous, it states that a preference is to be published giving the Defendant:
" priority over any applicant that does not have an existing sign. " Thus an applicant who already
has a sign, but wishes an additional sign or to modify that sign can be granted a permit. But if an
applicant does not have an existing sign, the permit must be offered first to the Defendant.
The Plaintiff admits that it did not publish the priority required in paragraph 13. Then it
erroneously states that the Defendant did not prove any damages. (Plaintiffs Brief p 20). The
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testimony at trial by expert witness Card contradicts the Plaintiffs misleading statements. (R.
438-439.) As does the testimony of the Defendant, who stated that the loss of the priority was
worth $143,728. (R. 401.) There are not only the financial damages, but the loss in terms of the
advantage of an "official endorsement" by having the Defendant's name in an City policy
publication is of tremendous proportion.
The findings of the trial court are not supported by the record. Defendant is entitled to
rescission based on the material breaches by the Plaintiff.
B.

Defendant Is Entitled to Rescission Because the Parties Can Be Restored to
Their Original Positions,.

Plaintiff errs in concluding that the Defendant cannot be restored to its original position.
This court can order that the Plaintiff issue valid permits for the signs and order that the signs be
reinstalled. Since the City paid no compensation, nor gave any value for the Stipulation, it has
not suffered any loss or damage for the past 13 years. The only "damages" to the City is the cost
of its attorney. (R. 277.) The Defendant did not "enjoy the benefits of the Stipulation" as
maintained by the Plaintiff. (Plaintiffs Brief P 21.) Contrary, the Defendant suffered damages
and irreparable harm. Supra. Plaintiff errs in asserting that the Defendant cannot seek rescission
and damages under general contract law. (Plaintiffs Brief P 22) Utah law expressly allows
recission or damages as alternate remedies, or a combination as may be required to do justice.
See, i.e., Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979).
Plaintiff complains that the Defendant is not entitled to recission because he comes before
the court with unclean hands. Plaintiff ignores the law which states that a party is not bound by a
contract when the other party has breached the agreement. Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279, 280-
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281 (Utah 1972). Thus, although the City unilaterally attempted to force the Defendant to abide
the terms of the Stipulation, while all along blatantly ignoring its own obligations, Defendant's
recalcitrance in performing after Plaintiffs default is neither "bad faith" nor "unclean hands."
The Defendant simply was utilizing a legal right. Unclean hands refers to some bad act against
the Plaintiff which should preclude recovery by the Defendant. There is no such bad act.11
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant failed to tender back what consideration it had
received. (Plaintiffs Brief p. 21.) The Defendant never received any consideration from the
City. Neither does the City claim any loss, other than its attorney fees - which were generated in
bad faith because the City attempted to force the Defendant to abide an agreement which the City
was in continual breach, and for which the City never tendered its own proper performance.
C.

The Defendant Put the Plaintiff on Notice About its Intent to Rescind the
Agreement; Furthermore this Issue Is Raised for the First Time on Appeal
and Should Not Be Considered.

The Defendant's first objection to the Stipulation was that it was not enforceable because
it was not properly executed, and was raised in 1985. When the Stipulation was ruled
enforceable, the Defendant immediately objected to the lack of performance by the City and
demanded rescission. This lack of performance was communicated to the City Council

11

The isolated instance where the Defendant was accused of violating a court order
arose after the Plaintiff mis-represented to the court that it had a right to demand that the
Defendant not remove the sign for the Chamber of Commerce. The violation was not against the
Plaintiff, but arose from the Plaintiffs own misdeed in misrepresenting to the court that the
Plaintiff had some enforceable right or interest in the Chamber sign when counsel knew all along
and at that time that the City had no such interest. (R. 148-150.) That event is not relevant to
the disposition of the disagreement between the parties. The Defendant did not act with unclean
hands against the Plaintiff. Indeed, the Defendant removed four sign structures at great financial
loss, while the Plaintiff failed to properly abide a single requirement placed on it by the
Stipulation.
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personally by the Defendant as well as through counsel. (R. 193.) The issue of timeliness of
Defendant's claim for rescission is raised by the Plaintiff for the first time on appeal and should
not be considered. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. 797 P.2d at 413.
D.

The Defendant Timely Prosecuted Its Case.

The Defendant initially believed that the Stipulation had not been entered into by either
party. The Defendant withdrew its signature, and the Plaintiff never gave any notice of its
intention to honor the Stipulation or perform thereunder. The Plaintiff filed a motion to compel
removal of a sign in 1986, which was resisted by the Defendant and eventually appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court. The Defendant did not learn of the results of the appeal until 1988 or 1989.
(R. 132.) In 1989 both parties filed motions, including a complaint by the Defendant. In 1990
the Defendant filed bankruptcy and the matter was for a while under the jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court. In 1993, 1994 and 1995 the parties filed additional motions which
culminated in the trial of all issues before Judge Noel in August, 1995. In addition, the
Defendant frequently appeared before the City Council seeking to negotiate a settlement of the
issues. (R. 192.) The claim that the Defendant did not timely prosecute his case is also raised for
the first time on appeal, and should not be considered. Supra.12
III. DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED AND IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES.
The damages represented by Exhibit #36 and expert witness Card arise from the breaches
committed by the City. Plaintiff attempts to construe these as damages arising from the removal

12

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sought "continuance after continuance"
inferring that the Defendant sought to delay the proceedings. (Plaintiffs Brief p. 28) The record
is fairly equally balanced by requests from both parties for continuances. This issue is also raised
for the first time on appeal.
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of the signs. That is partly correct, and these damages are relevant to the extent that the court
determines that damages are the correct remedy or should be used in conjunction with rescission.
However, defendant and Mr. Card testified explicitly regarding the damages sustained by the
Defendant. (Defendant's Exhibit 36; R. 320, 339, 342; 433; 372; 390; 401.)
The Defendant described the damages he sustained because he was required to remove
signs. These signs should have remained. The City had no right to require their removal because
the City was in breach. The Defendant should have the signs restored; and he should be
compensated for the lost income for the period of time that the signs are down. He should also
be compensated for the cost of removal and reinstallation of the signs.
Mr. Card testified to the general value of Defendant's signs. He also testified about the
value of the promises, i.e., the damages arising from the breach of the City. If the Defendant
cannot have his signs reinstalled, he is entitled, in addition to the lost revenues, to the value of
the permits and publication as testified by Mr. Card.
IV.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES; IF ANY PARTY IS
SO ENTITLED IT IS THE DEFENDANT
The Plaintiff admits that it (a) did not purchase or lease a sign; (b) that the permits issued

three years after the signing of the Stipulation were not valid under the then current ordinance;
and (c) that the City never published the preference which was required by paragraph 13. The
trial court made the same findings. These admissions cover virtually every duty placed on the
City, yet the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant's defense was "without merit and not asserted in
good faith." The threshold for a meritorious and good faith defense is very low. Watkiss &
Campbell v.Foa& Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).
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Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) relied on by Plaintiff, states 'without merit'
borders on frivolous and is defined as "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or
fact." The facts are that the Plaintiff breached every single requirement of the Stipulation. The
trial court awarded the Defendant damages based on his claims. Regardless of whether or not the
trial court found that the conduct of the Plaintiff could be excused, the very fact that the Plaintiff
admitted these breaches allows the Defendant to assert his defense in good faith. Watkiss, supra,.
The fact that the trial court found the City breached also negates any 'without merit" claim.
The Plaintiff also misstates the language of the 1986 order. (R, Exhibit 2.) That order
only ordered the Defendant to remove a sign. It made no other finding about the City's
performance - and neither did any other order. Therefore it is impermissible to infer that the
court considered any other aspect of the performance of the parties. Furthermore, regardless
whether a court order made a finding that the City was in substantial compliance, the Defendant
is entitled to continue to assert the City's defaults.
Plaintiff errs in concluding that just because the district court ordered the Defendant to
remove signs that he lacked a meritorious defense. There was no full trial on the merits until
August 1995. Prior to that time all of the court hearings were held on motions - which do not
provide for complete factual hearings and testimony. The Defendant testified that one of his
primary goals was to attempt a peaceful settlement with the Plaintiff. Arising from that intent the
Defendant made numerous appearances with the City, and in several such meetings came very
close to settlement. (R. 192.) There is a practical aspect to maintenance of signs within a City,
and part of that aspect is to maintain cordial relationships, so that the City does not act arbitrary
and capriciously to banish signs. In this case, the City had so acted in its ordinance of 1983. The
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Defendant's hope was to gain an amicable settlement with the City which would foster a
peaceful relationship between the parties. Ongoing settlement negotiations do not constitute
abandonment of a case. Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) (lack of prosecutorial
diligence was "reasonably excusable" in light of circumstances including settlement efforts,
defendants' unrealized opportunities to initiate progress, lack of prejudice to defendants, and
serious injustice as consequence of dismissal).
Plaintiff also errs in concluding that just because the Plaintiff was granted orders to have
signs removed, that such orders mean that the defenses raised by the Defendant were without
merit and in bad faith. If that is the standard of law, then no appeal would ever succeed. The
question to be analyzed is whether there was any good faith belief under the law or under the
facts for the Defendant to maintain his defense. The facts are clear - the Plaintiff breached each
of its duties under the Stipulation; the law is clear, the Defendant has no obligation to honor an
agreement which the other party breaches. Jackson v. Rich. 499 P.2d 279, 280-281 (Utah 1972).
The old maxim "what is good for the goose is good for the gander" should apply in this
case. The Plaintiff admits that it did not properly or timely comply with any of its requirements,
yet continually insisted that the Defendant be held to strict compliance with the Stipulation. The
record is clear that the Plaintiff made a conscious decision to accept the Stipulation on March 24,
1983 and purchase a sign, but it never even so much as communicated that decision to the
Defendant, let alone make the purchase. The permits issued were three years late, and did not
comply with the ordinance. The Plaintiff amended its ordinances twice, yet never attempted to
even facially comply with the Stipulation to publish the preference, instead banned off-premises
signs entirely. The Plaintiff seeks its attorney fees for its costs in requiring the signs to be
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removed. Yet for the entire period of this litigation there is not a single time when the City
complied in good faith with the terms of the Stipulation. Yet Plaintiff would require the removal
of all of Defendant's signs and seek attorney fees for its trouble. If U.C.A. § 78-27-56 is applied
to the Plaintiff, the results would be spectacularly interesting. The City defenses for failure to
perform are summarized:
a.
b.
c.

purchase or lease - admits breach, no defense;
defective untimely permits - admits breach; we didn't cure but we haven't
objected (yet);
failure to publish the preference - admits breach; we didn't have to because we
changed the ordinance.

These are the kind of actions which evince an action "without merit and not brought or asserted
in good faith." The only defense actually raised by the Plaintiff is that they allege a ruling from a
court which stated that the City had 'substantially performed' - Defendant did not find such a
ruling. It was Defendant who summarily prevailed on his claims, the Plaintiff admitted and the
judge confirmed on all accounts that the Plaintiff did not perform: no purchase; permits were
invalid; and the preference was not published. The defenses raised by the Plaintiff 'are without
merit. Defendant should be awarded its attorney fees under § 78-25-56.
V.

THE PLAINTIFF RELIES ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW FROM THE TRIAL COURT; THAT COURT DID NOT RELY ON THE
LAW AND THE ORDER CITES NO CASE LAW SUSTAINING ITS POSITION.
In its brief the Plaintiff makes a number of references to and in reliance on the Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court. The court did not cite a single case in
support of its ruling. A reading of that document discloses logical and legal inconsistencies.
On page 3, paragraph 5, the trial court stated: "Plaintiff has never challenged the validity
of the permits and Defendant has presented no evidence which shows that the permits are invalid
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or unenforceable." The Defendant introduced at trial a copy of the current ordinance
(Addendum) and copies of all of the minutes of the City Council for the time period in question.
There was no record of a City Council approval; the permits were drafted and signed by the
mayor, not the zoning administrator. The law states that a municipality cannot ignore its own
ordinances13, yet the mayor ignored them in issuing the permits. The only evidence introduced
by the City supporting the permits was the Mayor's statement that he issued the permits on
authority of the City Council, but he could not state when that was given, nor could he find any
reference in the Council minutes. (R. 221.)
On page 4, paragraph 7, the trial court stated: "Plaintiff has passed an Ordinance making
it illegal to construct off-premises signs. Nothing in the Stipulation prevented the City from
adopting such an Ordinance." That is a technically correct statement regarding the language of
the Stipulation, but it does not reflect the law. It ignores the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing required of parties to an agreement. Olympus Hills Shopping Center. Ltd. v. Smith's
Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App. 1994). It is not a legal excuse for
performance. (See, discussion of contracts, supra.)
On page 4, paragraph 8, the trial court stated: "No useful purpose would be served by
requiring Plaintiff to publish Defendant's priority for off-premises signs along Interstate 80
because such signs are unlawful under Plaintiffs present Zoning Ordinance." One useful
purpose would have been at least to show intent to comply with the Stipulation. Another would
be to anticipate that the Zoning Ordinance may change. This refusal ignores the covenant of

Sandv v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992).
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good faith and fair dealing which is required of all parties to an agreement, id. It also ignores
the doctrines discussed infra regarding contracts (i.e., consideration, mutuality, etc.).
VI.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON ITS DAMAGE AWARD.
Plaintiff errs when it states that the time of the Plaintiffs failure to purchase cannot be

fixed at a particular time. The City made its election to purchase on March 24, 1983. Paragraph
1 states: "when the Plaintiff determines to either lease or purchase the sign, Defendant agrees to
provide and erect the sign face within sixty (60) days after notification by Defendant."14 The
time for Plaintiffs performance is 60 days after March 24, 1983. If Defendant failed to perform,
then Plaintiff had a duty to tender. However, the Plaintiff failed to give notice of its election. It
cannot cause the default and then argue that the time for performance never commenced.
Plaintiff relies on Nielson v. Droubay. 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), but misinterprets it.
The Droubays had, in circumstances beyond their control, offered substantial compliance with an
option to purchase; that compliance was accepted by the Nielsons and relied on by the Droubays.
Delays in exercising an option did not injure the Droubays and the parties attempted to proceed
jointly in resolving the problems. Here, however, the facts are inapposite. The Plaintiff has not
substantially complied, and did not provide any performance upon which the Defendant relied.
Utah law favors prejudgment interest:
In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is
fixed as of a particular time. Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171,
177 (Utah App. 1993):

14

This wording is probably a typographical error, it should read "notice to
Defendant" to allow the Defendant 60 days to erect the sign.
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Here the damage is complete, the amount of loss can be fixed at a specific amount at a
specific time, i.e., sixty days after March 28, 1983. Interest should be allowed also on the
damages arising from the removal of the signs from the date the signs were removed.
None of Plaintiff s arguments or objections to prejudgment interest were raised at trial
and it is not appropriate to raise them here. Supra.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs arguments do not support the trial court's ruling. The trial court's ruling is
not supported by the record. The Plaintiff breached each of its duties under the Stipulation, all of
which were material. Its breach precluded any further duty of the Defendant to perform. The
Defendant suffered cognizable damages and maintained a timely, good faith and meritorious
defense. The Plaintiff did not maintain a meritorious defense, and acted in bad faith by filing a
lawsuit it knew could not prevail; demanding performance while not tendering its own
performance; by misrepresenting material facts to the district court about its interest in the
Chamber sign; and by issuing invalid permits, no better than the original licenses. The order of
the trial court should be set aside. Defendant is lawfully and equitably entitled to rescission of
the Stipulation, judgment for the costs of restitution and damages, prejudgment interest and
attorney fees.
Respectfully Submitted t h i s ^ ^ a a y of Ai
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ADDENDUM

March 9, 1983 (cont)
Zoning Hearing
Ronny Moore mentioned that he is against the new Industrial Zoning along
the railroad tracks.
The concerned citizens wanted to know if the zoning would be voted on
tonight? The Mayor said that the City Council will have a special
meeting. Leon Simister said there are only three Councilmembers' here
tonight and it would be best to have all present.
William M. Judd mentioned that he appreciated these people coming out
to let us know how they feel. He said he can't see why it can't be
zoned to fit their needs.
A special meeting will be held on Thursday, March 24, 1983 at 7:30 p.m.
At this time, there will be a short discussion on the new proposed zoning
ordinance before it is passed. They are invited to attend if they want
to.
Meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m.
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Recorder

SPECIAL
L ME^TJNG HELD MARCH 24, 1983
This meeting is being held in the old court room, Summit County Court
House, 60 North Main.
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson called the meeting to order at 7:30 p.m.
Councilmembers present were Grant Geary, Russell S. Judd, William M.
Judd and Colleen R. Sargent with Gerald D. Ball absent due to work
schedule. Also present were Violet V. Judd, Treasurer; Wendy D. Richins,
Recorder; Terry Christianson, City Attorney; Stan Strebel and Jerry Smith,
County Planning Commission; L. Craig Vernon, Robert K. Banz, Dennis Wright,
Board of Adjustments; Woodrow Nielson, Edwin L. Judd, and Lafe Bowen, Planning Commission.
Others in attendance were:
Name

Business (if applicable)

Boyd E. Willoughby- - - - - - - - - - - - Jim Blonquist
Phyllis Smith
Mrs. Richard Aoki
Frank W. Moore- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bob Willoughby
Thomas W. Moore - - - - - - - - - - - - - Marcie Palmer
Roger Palmer
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Blair E. Blonquist
Leon Simister
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - George Wallace
E. Louise Wallace
J. Rose Wallace
Sharla Banz - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dwain Clark
R. R. Torman
Ed Ercanbrack
Blaine C. Blonquist - - - - - - - - - - - Afton W. Blonquist
Gertrude Willoughby - - - - - - - - - - - Helen Blonquist
R. Lynn Clark
Reed Warner

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Willoughby Oil Service

Businessman, homeowner, tax
payer
Station Owner

Blonquist Mink Ranch
Wallace Enterprises Mobile Home Park

Station Owner
Blonquist Mink Ranch
Blonquist Mink Ranch
Coalville Shopping Center
Valley View Mobile Park

March 24, 1983 (cont)
Special Meeting
George and Louise Wallace are upset with the proposed Commercial
Overlay because if they decide to sell their trailer park, the
market value will be cut because of the new proposed zoning. They
bought it as General Commercial and if they sell, they want to sell
it as General Commercial, not Commercial Overlay.
It was mentioned that Coalville City is trying to keep the oil well
business and its people out of Coalville. Russell S. Judd wanted to
set the record straight that Coalville City is not trying to keep the
oil businesses out of the City. They have provided employment for
alot of the towns people.
Dennis Wright said that it is the landowners that control the City
from growing. There are about six or seven people that will not
sell any of their land.
Leon Simister said that the restricted area of General Commercial
will not let much development come in. We are very limited on Main
Street.
The Mayor recommended that the City Council put it back in the laps
of the Planning Commission. They should advertise so the meetings
can be attended by the the people if they so desire. In 30 days
we should have it back so the Council can plan for another public
hearing.
The Mayor mentioned that the businessmen should get together and
form a Chamber of Commerce. We need someone to represent Coalville
City at the meetings we are invited to attend.
Leon Simister thanked the Planning Commission for their time in
working on the proposed zoning ordinances and for answering their
questions tonight.
Russell S. Judd mentioned that Buster Keyes would like the zoning
on his property changed to Agricultural because he felt that best
suited him for his ranching operation.
Stan Strebel suggested that the businessmen as well as any residents
make application in writting of the changes they would like to see in
the new proposed zoning ordinances. They should have this done by
Monday, April 11, 1983. They can be sent to City Hall and then given
to the Planning Commission. The Mayor will put an article in the paper
concerning this. By Monday, April 25, 1983, the revised ordinances
should be given to the City Council. An advertisement will be published on Friday, May 6, 1983 for a public hearing to be held on Monday, May 23, 1983. William M. Judd made a motion that we refer any
changes back to the Planning Commission and to follow through with
the date schedules as outlined for the ordinance work. Russell S.
Judd seconded the motion. All ayes.
The citizens left at this time.
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned the bill boards with All Associates.
He mentioned the present schedule of the present bill boards. The Mayor
said that the place where Billy's used to be is now open. It could be
used as a "Welcome to Coalville" sign. Al Lundgren said his cost would
not be more than $5,200.00. If Coalville City bought the sign, they
would take over the lease on the land until it runs out with C. B. Copley. Terry Christianson said the bill should be itemized. He suggested
that we make a decision now so this can be settled. He advised buying
the sign so that we have a chance of getting the rest of the signs down,
in the future. If we don't buy the sign, we will be back in litigation
and with our present zoning ordinances, we would probably loose. If
the City buys the sign, they will have to maintain it. As long as the

March 24, 1983 (cont)
Special Meeting
contract is in force, we would have to pay the $200.00 a year and lease
the property. Terry Christianson aaid we have four choices: 1. Sign
the agreement and buy the sign so that all the signs will be down in 20
years, 2. Go with the law suit that we will probably loose, leaving the
signs up indefinitely, 3. Drop the law suit and the signs will be up as
long as he wants them, or 4. Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made a motion
that we purchase the sign in order to close the litigation. Colleen R.
Sargent seconded the motion. All ayes, but Grant Geary who opposed. The
Mayor and Attorney signed the Order of Dismissal.
Mayor Merlyn W. Johnson mentioned that he wrote a letter to Crandall
Ford-Mercury dated March 10, 1983 concerning the $88.00 invoice no. 10742
dated January 26, 1983. A reply written the next day was read by the
Mayor. The invoice was itemized so the Council could see where the money
was used. In addition, five quarts of oil and an oil filter were used and
omitted from the invoice. William M. Judd made a motion to pay the $88.00
invoice in full. Grant Geary seconded the motion. All ayes but Russell
S. Judd who opposed.
The Mayor mentioned that Utah Power & Light needs a Minute entry for
electricity to be run to the new water storage tank at 600 South 200
East. He also needs authorization to sign a sales tax exemption certificate on the water tank and an electric Service Agreement for both
the water tank and the new sewer plant. Russell S. Judd made a motion
to enter into the agreements with Utah Power & Light on the water tank
and new sewer system. William M. Judd seconded the motion. All ayes.
Terry Christianson, City Attorney, mentioned that he will not give any
legal opinions to people who come in on City business. The Mayor or
City Council will have to do this for the people if they deem it necessary.
The reason for this was^the treatment he and his staff received when contacted by an aggrevated citizen demanding the tapes from the Planning
Commission meetings.
R. Lynn Clark mentioned that he needs 1,000 rounds of ammunition for
practice to maintain his position of being a certified officer. The
Council approved.
R. Lynn Clark showed three building permits for approval. Afton Blonquist would like to build a 25' x 200' mink shed. There are now 11 sheds
on 3.5 acres. William M. Judd made a motion to approve the permit, seconded by Grant Geary. All ayes.
Stan Strebel has a building permit for a double garage. Arnie Bosworth
would also like to put in a double garage. Grant Geary made a motion to
to accept both permits, seconded by William M. Judd. All ayes.
The Mayor mentioned that he will be tied up for the next ten Mondays beginning April 4, 1983. He has a class he has to attend. A Mayor Pro-Tem
will be appointed to take over for him at any meetings.
The Mayor mentioned the right-of-ways needed from Dave and Ren Wilde to
get to the water storage tank. Dave has agreed on one water and sewer
hookup and $1,500.00 in cash. He has requested a receipt for the hookups.
Ren Wilde could possibly settle for around $4,200.00. We can make application to HUD to help on this. We will need a 66' street between
Ren and Dave. This .8 of an acre will run around $15,000.00. A chainlink fence will be put up on the South side of the street.
Meeting adjourned at 10:30 p.m.
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